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A growing body of scholarly work is devoting atten-
tion to how Muslim traditions articulate notions that
might fit the standards of a modern polity.1 This re-
search focus calls into question the extent to which
such notions become ingrained in the norms of mod-
ern public spheres, which represent the communica-
tive and legitimizing basis of potentially democratic
political systems. The reconfiguration of the norma-
tive discourses and the institutional footing of Islam-
ic ÔreformÕ movements in the framework of public
spheres can be termed Ôpublic IslamÕ.
ÕPublic IslamÕ and
the Nation-State
in Egypt
Even in times of burgeoning forms of social
association and mobilization carried under
Islamic banners, which are based on local
(sub-national) and (global) transnational
levels, it should be acknowledged that the
nation-state framework has been historical-
ly the major platform for the rise of such
norms of public Islam. Egyptian society and
its history present an interesting case for re-
locating the notion of the public sphere
within nation-state building. The specific in-
terest in analysing public Islam relates to
how the self-reforming impetus of religious
traditions impacts notions of social justice,
welfare and governance as well as Ôsocial
healthÕ, and on the political process at large.
The public sphere and
Ô p u b l i c I s l a m Õ
That Muslim reformers were the hub of the
public sphere at the stage of its emergence
in the second half of the 19t h century and for
several decades thereafter, might seem to
clash with Habermasian presuppositions
that see a modern public sphere as free from
the allegedly ritualistic and Ôrepresentation-
alÕ features of traditional notions of public-
ness. Several other scholars have, however,
stressed that also in Western societies the
role of puritan and pietistic socio-religious
movements and reformers has not been the
exception, but the rule. The public sphere is
the site where contests take place over the
definition not only of the Ôcommon goodÕ,
but also of the catalogue of virtues, obliga-
tions, and rights required of the members of
society (in due time citizens of the nation-
state). The emergent sense of public goes
hand in hand with the diffusion of norms
whereby a member of the community is de-
fined as an autonomous moral-social agent,
and is simultaneously expected to be com-
mitted to the collective goals of the commu-
nity. Therefore, it should not be surprising
that reformed religious traditions play a role
in the process. It would be impossible to un-
derstand the political and legal philosophy
of Locke outside of the framework of Calvin-
ist reform theology.
In a comparable vein, from the 1870s on-
wards, Muslim reformers in Egypt, acting
not only as writers but also as editors, pub-
lishers and sponsors of new and largely au-
tonomous press organs, expanded the area
of Islamic normative discourse into issues of
collective concern like state law, distribu-
tion of wealth, and work ethics, which are of
vital significance for any modernizing soci-
ety. As shown by Michael Gasper, the Islam-
ic reform movement (i s l a h) established the
conceptual frame defining the external
boundaries of the ÔsocietyÕ on the basis of
which the nation-state was defined, includ-
ing the lines of exclusion and inclusion. The-
orizing about Ôsocial illsÕ, they saw in proper-
ly intended Islamic traditions the cure at
hand. A contemporary of Muhammad CA b-
d u h, CA b d a l l a h al-Nadim (1845-1896), de-
fined virtue not just in terms of the canoni-
cal injunction al-amr b i - l - m acr u f wa al-nahi
ca n a l - m u n k a r (enjoining good and forbid-
ding evil), but as tied to economic develop-
ment and ÔindustriousnessÕ.2
However, we cannot assume that the pub-
lic intellectuals of the Islamic reform were
just playing into the hands of the nation-
state. They influenced state educational and
legal policies, and initiated autonomous
projects within the associational life of the
main urban centres, whilst backing up both
activities with a public discourse that
brought to bear a distinctive view of the
Muslim moral being. From that historical
moment on, a whole spectrum of differenti-
ated attitudes of personalities, groups and
movements of public Islam has developed
as to how to manage the state and its ambi-
tion to normalize and incorporate public
Islam into the normative standards of the
nation-state framework (first and foremost
ÔcitizenshipÕ, and a culturalization of Islam
into a major factor of national identity also
acceptable to non-Muslim minorities).
The reformersÕ intervention in Muslim tra-
ditions in the context of the formation of a
modern public sphere did not collapse tra-
ditional notions of personhood, community
and authority into the modern model of
personal responsibility and loyalty to the
nation-state. On the other hand, state poli-
cies could only gain coherence in an episte-
mological terrain that the emergent Ôpublic
IslamÕ foregrounded no less than colonial
policies did. The bottom line is that it would
be very difficult to prove that the emer-
gence of public Islam was either purely
functional or merely reactive to the process
of nation-state formation.
If the normative framework associated
with public Islam does not perfectly fit na-
tion-state building, this is because the virtues
propagated by the reformers, whilst indeed
favouring social mobilization and disciplin-
ing in the framework of the nation-state,
were not conceived in terms of formulas of
citizenship within a civil law setting, but were
seen as rooted in s h a r ica. This notion, more
than ÔIslamic lawÕ, signifies something like ÔIs-
lamic normativityÕ or ÔIslamic normative rea-
sonÕ (at least as used and implemented in the
discourse of modern Muslim reformers).
Mustafa Mahmud
This pattern of disjunction and partial con-
vergence between nation-state building and
public Islam that we meet in the reform dis-
course of CA b d a l l a h al-Nadim is still found a
century later Ð under modified circum-
stances of the state-society relationship Ð in
the work of Mustafa Mahmud, probably the
main personality of public Islam in Egypt. In
the period of his ascent to public moral au-
thority in the 1970s and 1980s, the cleavage
between state-loyal vs. oppositional, or Ôin-
tegrationistÕ vs. ÔisolationistÕ Islam, not un-
problematic if applied to the period be-
tween the 1920s and 1960s, becomes ever
less capable of capturing the reconfigura-
tion of public Islam v i s -  - v i s the nation-state.
The principal generator of public moral au-
thority in Islamic terms that Mustafa Mah-
mud was able to play upon was the idea of a
continuity between personal excellence and
rectitude on the one hand, and commitment
to the welfare of the community on the
other. Mustafa Mahmud impersonated this
script of public virtue as the founder of the
most famous new Islamic j a mci y y a ( w e l f a r e
association) in Cairo, and as the author and
moderator of a very popular television docu-
mentary series on a l -ci l m w a - l - i m a n ( s c i e n c e
and faith), where he has proven capable of
swaying Islamic discourse back and forth
across the thin border between the edifying
and the entertaining. Through this television
programme that he set up from scratch in
the early 1970s, Mustafa Mahmud belongs
to the pioneers of Egyptian television, a
medium that rapidly spread into middle
class households. In the post-Nasser political
context Ð where the repressive capacities of
the state with respect to its citizens are tech-
nically intact or even refined, although they
no longer enjoy a solid legitimacy Ð the pub-
lic styling of self-correctness and its rooting
in religious credibility and authority have
been crucial conditions for the efficacy of
discourse, as the success story of Mustafa
Mahmud shows. This credibility is also sup-
ported by the social work of the j a mci y y a
Mustafa Mahmud founded in 1975: growing
in size and range of (mainly medical) services
up to the present (see photo).
As also shown by the path of Mustafa
Mahmud, the acquisition of credentials of
public Islamic authority is subject to increas-
ing differentiation: v i s -  - v i s the state, public
Islam might be in a relation of collaboration,
complicity, indifference, suspicion, hostility
and outward opposition to terrorism (at the
level where Islam eclipses from public visi-
bility). Moreover, the success of one or the
other new Islamic spokesmen is certainly
dependent on an increasing degree of ca-
pacity to match the needs and orientations
of a composite public. This makes the stateÕs
task of controlling public Islam ever more
difficult. More generally, and in a line of con-
tinuity from the early stages of public Islam
in the late 19t h-century Egypt till today, the
state is not the source of authorization of
even state-friendly forms of public Islam.
A balanced notion of
p u b l i c I s l a m
The Habermasian claim that the public
sphere creates social cohesion through
mechanisms alternative to state coercion
and market interest is still basically valid,
and also applies to public Islam. More than
that, this force of cohesion is exactly what
religious-civilizing traditions, as major
sources of collective identities, have been
capable of doing since times long prior to
the rise of modern nation-states. Therefore,
in the rise and transformation of public
Islam one can find instances of how reli-
gious traditions justify claims of member-
ship within the community that articulate
the tense relationship between individual
salvation and social order.
If the Habermas framework is too narrow to
capture the way public Islam is rooted in Is-
lamic traditions and their ongoing reform, di-
luting public Islam into a Ôpost-modernÕ kind
of politics of subjectivity, visibility and im-
agery does not do justice to how reformed Is-
lamic traditions authorize views of social jus-
tice and practices of social welfare. By linking
collective identity to forms of subjectivity
that might prove difficult to ascertain, or to a
plainly staged visibility as a Ôpolitics of dis-
playÕ of signs, post-modern accounts of pub-
lic Islam fail to duly link Muslim identity to
welfare and justice, and also fail to focus on
the mechanisms of recognition that autho-
rize identity and legitimize visibility. The pos-
sible usefulness of a transculturally feasible,
post-Habermasian notion of the public
sphere that can be applied to the transforma-
tion of religious traditions and the emer-
gence of a vast array of socio-religious move-
ments, is in helping to frame the platform
where nation-state projects on identity, jus-
tice and welfare intersect and overlap with Ð
and sometimes are challenged by Ð move-
ments and projects grounded on (often con-
sciously reformed) religious traditions.
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